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SUMMARY 
The Internet has had and will continue to have a major impact in the way in which 
banking business is conducted. This dissertation primarily considers the allocation of 
risks associated with Internet banking and in doing so considers the role of trade 
usage in Internet banking. 
The question of what the Internet is and more specifically what constitutes Internet 
banking is addressed. 
In order to have an understanding of the allocation of risks in Internet banking a good 
understanding of the traditional bank-customer relationship is necessary. The 
contractual basis for this relationship is discussed. 
The duties of the bank and the customer are discussed. In this regard the duty of a 
bank to act in terms of its customers mandate, the banks duty of confidentiality and 
the customers duty to exercise reasonable care are considered. The concept of a 
customer is briefly discussed. 
As trade usage plays a significant role in the contract between the bank and its 
customer, attention is given to the requirement for the recognition of a trade usage 
generally and more particularly in South Africa. 
The effect of Internet banking on the traditional bank-customer relationship is 
considered. The fact that a bank is still required to act in terms of its customer's 
mandate but is unable to identify is examined. 
As most Internet banking contracts impose an obligation on the customer to take 
security precautions and also limit the liability of banks, consideration is finally given 
to the possibility that the practices of banks in regard to Internet banking may have 
acquired the status of trade usage in this particular sphere of banking. 
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1 Introduction 
According to a recent newspaper article 
'[t]echnology is reshaping the South African banking industry as it encourages 
new market entrants, new delivery channels and empowers customers. The 
new service delivery channels, especially the Internet and more sophisticated 
telecommunications, have changed the structure of banks and their channels 
to market' (see Greg Gordon 'SURVEY/Internet Financial Services' Sunday 
Times (Business Times) April 23 2000 at 9). 
There is no doubt that the advent of the Internet will fundamentally change the way in 
which banks have done business in the past. More importantly are the possible 
changes in the legal relationship between bank and customer resulting from Internet 
banking. 
Changes in the traditional bank-customer relationship will undoubtedly occur (see I 
Pearson 'The future of banking' at http://www.gadget.co.za consulted on 22 August 
2000). It has been said, in dealing with the subject of electronic fund transfers, that it 
would be an oversimplification to state that '[t]he relationship of banker and customer 
is fairly well settled, and all that will be needed is the fitting of changed methods into 
an established framework' (see Enyon Smart 'Electronic Banking: An overview of the 
legal implications in: Roy M Goode (ed) Electronic Banking: The Legal Implications 
(1985) at 1 ). 
It is submitted that only a thorough analysis of the traditional bank-customer 
relationship and the effects of Internet banking will settle the issue with any certainty. 
However, before embarking on such an analysis two issues merit brief discussion viz. 
what is the Internet and what is Internet banking. 
1. 1 What is the Internet? 
The Internet has its origins in the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
('ARPANET') a project of the United States Department of Defense aimed at creating 
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a computer network linking government agencies and universities. The intention of 
the Department of Defense was that ARPANET would continue to function even if it 
were destroyed in a nuclear attack (see Reinhardt Buys & Johan Rothman 'The 
Internet: An Overview' in: Reinhardt Buys (ed) Cyberlaw@ South Africa: The Law of 
the Internet in South Africa (2000) at 34 and; John R Levine & Carol Baroudi The 
Internet for Dummies (1993) at 11 ). 
From these beginnings the Internet has grown into a worldwide collection of 
computer networks linking not only government agencies and universities, but also 
businesses and private individuals. According to one writer more than 60 per cent of 
the networks which comprise the Internet are now run by business (Michelle L Kezar 
'Logging on to electronic means of payment' (1997) April 13 Government Finance 
Review 57 at 58). 
There are an estimated 20 to 40 million people in 140 countries, which have access 
to the Internet. In South Africa alone it is estimated that in 1999 there were more 
than 1 million people using the Internet (see Buys op cit at 34). It is not surprising 
therefore that banks throughout the world have seen the Internet as an opportunity to 
'expand beyond their "physical footprints" (see Ciaran Ryan 'SURVEY/Retail 
Banking' Sunday Times (Business Times) April 30 2000 at 6). 
Given that banks are actively endeavouring to establish a net presence consideration 
will now be given to the nature of Internet banking. 
1.2 Internet banking 
Banks have traditionally operated through branch outlets and more recently 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). The emergence of electronic forms of 
conducting banking business such as telephone banking, ATMs and more recently 
Internet banking has thus far merely augmented the traditional gateways. According 
to Ryan (op cit at 6) '[m]any banks are still struggling to develop a compelling 
business case for Internet banking'. The reason is that banks are still somewhat 
uncertain of what the full impact of Internet banking will entail. 
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In a recent report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
House of Representatives, it is stated that an estimated seven per cent of banks 
active in the United States had implemented online (or Internet) banking services as 
of June 1997. In addition to this, the report states that by the end of 1998 an 
estimated 47 per cent of banks in the United States would be offering some form of 
online banking service (see Report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking and 
Financial Services, House of Representatives Electronic Banking - Experiences 
Reported by Banks in implementing online banking 15 January 1998). 
Internet banking however is not limited to traditional banks offering some or all of 
their services via the Internet. There already are a number of banks worldwide which 
offer their services exclusively via the Internet. These virtual banks, as they are 
known, operate without the need for opening offices, with most of the traditional 
functions associated with back offices being outsourced (see Damon Darlin 'Try E-
banking: electronic banking a maturing technology' (1997) 159(1) Industry Trend of 
Event, Forbes January 68 at 68 to 69; Allison J Keyes 'Virtual Banking' ( 1999) 30(3) 
Black Enterprise, 145 at 145; Bill Orr 'E-banks or E-Branches' (1999) 91 (7) ABA 
Banking Journal 32 at 32). 
The four major retail banks in South Africa (being First National Bank, Standard 
Bank, Nedbank and ABSA) all maintain a presence on the Internet in some or other 
form and all offer some form of Internet banking service. 
In South Africa neither the common law nor legislation presently caters for the 
establishment of virtual banks. However, in a position paper published by the South 
African Reserve Bank, the Reserve Bank states its intention to: 
support the development of a banking industry vision for electronic substitutes for 
physical bank notes and coins; and 
support the development of national standards to enable inter-operability of 
electronic money products and devices. 
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(see Position Paper NPS 11199 Electronic Money published by the South African 
Reserve Bank National Payment System Division in April 1999 at 
http://www.resbank.co.za/NPS!pp0499 consulted on 14 June 2000). 
What services do traditional South African banks offer their customers via the 
Internet? Two examples will suffice. First National Bank customers are offered the 
following Internet banking services: Balance enquiries; mini statements; interim 
statements (30 transactions); account payments; transfer funds; cheque book orders; 
change ATM card PIN; stop payment of cheques; rates; open investment accounts 
and stop orders (see FNB Electronic Banking (nd) unpaginated). Standard Bank, 
inter alia, offers the following services to their customers: future dated payments; 
share and portfolio services; beneficiary services; send messages to your branch; 
e.mail Standard Bank; update personal Internet information; secure online banking 
(see Standard Bank Internet Banking (nd) at 4). 
Internet banking provides customers with the ability to perform most of the traditional 
banking transactions via the Internet. The only transaction that a customer is unable 
to perform via a personal computer is the withdrawal of cash. In time however the 
replacement of 'real' forms of cash with digital or electronic cash may obviate the 
need for consumers to withdraw money from ATMs. A discussion of this issue is, 
however not within the ambit of this paper. 
The basic types of Internet transactions, which can be performed via the Internet, can 
be summarised as follows: 
Balance inquiry and funds transfer; 
Account payments; 
Ordering of cheque books; 
Changing of personal identification numbers and other personal Internet banking 
details; 
Opening of accounts; 
Stop orders; and 
Stop payment of cheques. 
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According to the American Bankers Association it has been estimated that by the end 
of 1998 an estimated seven million households (approximately seven per cent of all 
households) in the United States were making use of Internet banking services. By 
July 1999 49 per cent of all American households had personal computers and at 
least 37 per cent of households has accessed the Internet (see Anon 'At last Internet 
Banking takes off (1999) 91 (7) ABA Journal 36 at 36). 
By the end of 1999 there were approximately 242 000 people subscribing to Internet 
banking services in South Africa (see Greg Gordon 'Internet Banking steps into the 
21st century' Sunday Times (Business Times) May 21 2000 at 17). This represents 
approximately 20 per cent of all Internet users in South Africa. 
Most banks that offer Internet banking services require customers to agree to 
additional terms and conditions, over and above those, which are usually implied in 
the traditional bank-customer contract. These additional terms and conditions inter 
alia provide for authorisation and security methods to verify a customer's identity. In 
most cases the risk for any loss arising from mistake by the bank or fraud perpetrated 
by a third party is borne by the customer. Banks generally limit their liability for 
losses arising only from their own gross negligence. The customer bears the risk for 
the unauthorized use of his facility (see Derick Swart 'Online banking law and 
payment systems' in: Buys op cit at 294). 
This paper will consider the effect of Internet banking on the traditional bank-
customer relationship. However in order to do this it will be necessary to discuss the 
legal aspects of the traditional bank-customer relationship. 
2 The bank - customer relationship 
2.1 Contractual basis of the relationship 
The contract between the bank and its customer is based on the principle that when 
the customer deposits money with his bank, the bank acquires the right to use the 
money for its own purposes in other words the bank becomes the owner of the 
money deposited (Foley v Hill [1848] 2 HL Cas 28; S v Kearney 1964 (2) SA 495 (A); 
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Oantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v National Explosives (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 
736 (A); Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Bank of Lisbon International Limited 
1994 (1) SA 205 (N)). The bank is, however, also required to repay an equal amount 
of money, either at a fixed time or on call. 
According to Willis (Nigel Willis Banking in South African Law ( 1981) at 30) the 
contract between the bank and its customer most closely resembles that of mutuum. 
Mutuum is described as a contract in which 'one person delivers some fungible thing 
to another person who is bound subsequently to return to the former a thing of the 
same kind, quality and quantity' (Wille's Principles of South African Law 8 ed (1991) 
by Dale Hutchison et al at 576). The borrower under a contract of mutuum becomes 
the owner of the thing when it is delivered to him. In Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corp 
([1921] 3 KB 110 at 127) (as discussed in Chorley & Smart Leading cases in the Law 
of Banking 6 ed by P E Smart 1990 at 3) the court said, in relation to money which a 
bank receives from it's customer that the money is 'not to be held in trust for the 
customer, but the bank borrows the proceeds and undertakes to repay them'. 
The court further said that 
'it is necessarily a term of such contract that the bank is not liable to pay the 
customer the full amount of his balance until he demands payment from the 
bank ... ' 
Like Willis, Stassen is of the opinion that the deposit of money with a bank gives rise 
to a contract of mutuum, not only in relation to deposit accounts, but also in relation 
to cheque accounts (see J C Stassen "n Herwaardering van Engelsregtlike 
eienaardighede in die lig van die Suid-Afrikaanse gemene reg, Bankwet en 
Wisselwet' (1982) 4 Modem Business Law 80 at 82-83). 
Although the classification of the contract between the bank and its customer as one 
of mutuum satisfactorily explains the deposit element of the contract it leaves 
unresolved the nature of the contract in relation to the other duties a bank owes its 
customer. 
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According to Cowen and Gering (Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in 
South Africa 4 ed (1966) by Dennis V Cowen & Leonard Gering at 367) the 
relationship between the bank and its customer in some respects resembles that of 
agency. For example the use of cheques adopts the principles of agency in that a 
cheque is a mandate given by the customer to his bank which authorizes the bank to 
discharge it's indebtedness in a particular way. However Cowen and Geiring (op cit 
at 368) concludes that the only solution which satisfactorily explains the contract 
between the bank and its customer is to recognise the contract as a contract sui 
generis, containing elements of a number of contracts. It is submitted that depending 
on the particular transaction concluded the contract between the bank and its 
customer may be similar to either the contract of agency, mandate or mutuum. 
In Cambanis Buildings (Pty) Ltd v Gal (1983 (2) SA 182 (NC)) the court, in relation to 
a stop order instruction given to a bank by its customer, was prepared to regard the 
stop order as constituting the bank as an agent for purposes of effecting the stop 
order. According to the court 'it is well known that modern banking is involved in 
multifarious activities and banks, therefore, act as agents for clients in a variety of 
transactions.' However, it is submitted that the court's interpretation of the 
relationship between the bank and its customer generally, as one of agency was 
incorrect. It is possible that in certain circumstances the bank may find itself as 
acting as an agent for its customer, but it can not be said that the whole of the 
relationship between the bank and its customer can be described as one of agency. 
An agent is one who performs acts for and on behalf of another (the principal) and 
thereby places the principal in a legal relationship with a third party (see Willis op cit 
at 31; De Wet and Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontrakte en Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 
by J C De Wet & A H van Wyk at 86). 
It is submitted that the bank does not generally perform acts on behalf of its 
customers with the intention of creating legal obligations of its customer. 
According to Hutchison et al (op cit at 594) an agent usually performs some or all of 
the following acts on behalf of his principal: 
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Concludes contracts and acquires personal rights against third parties; 
Enforces the principal's rights against third parties; 
Accepts the performances of third persons, thus extinguishing the obligations: 
and 
Makes performance of the principal's obligations to third parties. 
In carrying out his mandate an agent may not delegate his duties, must act within the 
limits of his powers, carry out his duties with the utmost good faith and to the benefit 
of only his principal, render an account of the transactions to the principal and deliver 
to the principal all the property and pay all proceeds he has received in connection 
with the transaction (see Hutchison et al op cit at 599 et seq). 
While a bank, like an agent, owes a duty of secrecy to its customer and although the 
use of cheques may show elements of agency, the bank in most instances cannot be 
regarded as an agent of its customer. This is because an agent is required to keep 
his principals money and property separate from his own, which the bank does not 
do (see De Villiers and Macintosh: The Law of Agency in South Africa 3 ed ( 1981) by 
Jonathan M Silke at 330). In addition to this the agent, unlike a bank, is also required 
to act solely for the benefit of the principal (see Willis op cit at 31 ). 
Although the classification of the contract between a bank and its customer as one of 
agency may be appropriate in certain circumstances, such as in carrying out a stop 
order instruction, it still falls short of satisfactorily explaining the contractual basis 
existing between a bank and its customer in the many other instances where the 
bank does not act as agent of the customer. In Estate Ismail v Barclays Bank 
(OC&O) (1957 (4) SA 17 (T) at 26 as cited in the Cambanis Buildings case supra at 
135G) it was said that 
'[a] bank may contract to act as an agent for its customer in certain aspects 
(my emphasis) of its business ... ' 
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2.1.1 The contract of mandate as the basis for the contract between the bank and 
its customer 
If the contract between the bank and its customer can not be satisfactorily explained 
with reference to agency alone the possibility remains that it could be classified as a 
contract of mandate. 
2. 1. 1. 1 The nature of the contract 
Mandate is a contract in terms of which the mandatory undertakes to carry out an 
obligation on behalf of the mandator (see De Wet op cit at 346). 
In Standard Bank of SA Limited v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (1995 (4) SA 510 
(C)) at 530G the court stated that 
'over time jurists have considered characterising and explaining the basic 
relationship as one of depositum, mutuum or agency. All of these approaches 
have on analysis proved to be inadequate.' 
On the basis of this the contract of mandate alone can not adequately describe the 
basis of the contract between the bank and its customer. The contract between a 
bank and its customer is probably best described as a debtor-creditor relationship 
with a number of super-added obligations on both the bank and the customer. The 
basic bank-customer relationship may however be extended (or curtailed) by express 
agreement (see Willie and Millin 's Mercantile Law of South Africa 18 ed ( 1984) by J F 
Coaker & D T Zeffert at 730-731). 
2.1.1.2 The duties of the parties arising out of the contract of mandate 
The mandatory is required to carry out his mandate in good faith and to the best of 
his ability. He may not derive any benefit out of his mandate and he may receive no 
secret profits, otherwise he will be liable to the mandator for breach of contract. The 
mandator, on the other hand, is required to compensate the mandatory for any costs, 
which it may have incurred (see De Wet op cit at 341-342). 
9 
Whilst the bank, in the performance of its duties. is required to perform such duties in 
good faith and to the best of its ability, a bank does not necessarily derive any benefit 
from the relationship. Likewise, there is no duty on the customer to compensate the 
bank for costs incurred in the performance of its duties. The contract arising out of 
the relationship between a bank and its customer cannot be explained by reference 
to the contract of mandate. 
2.2 Contractual terms 
A contract is an agreement between two or more persons giving rise to personal 
rights and obligations on the part of both parties to the contract (Hutchison et al op cit 
at 409). The parties may agree to the incorporation of certain terms in a contract or 
such terms may be incorporated by law. The terms of a contract may be classified as 
the essentiale, naturale and accidentale. 
The essentialia of a contract are those terms that serve to classify a contract as a 
particular type or class of contract. For example, the essentialia of a contract of sale 
are that there is consensus as to the thing that is sold, the price and the exchange of 
one for the other. As far as the price is concerned it should be fixed or at least 
fixable by a standard agreed upon by the parties. Where the parties, instead of 
agreeing on a price, agree to exchange something the one has for something the 
other has without reaching agreement on the price, then the contract would not be 
one of sale, but rather one of exchange or some other contract. 
The contract between the bank and its customer is essentially one of debtor and 
creditor with a number of super-added obligations. In some cases, such as payment 
of cheques, certain principles of mandate may apply. In other instances the 
relationship resembles that of mutuum. However, there are no real and distinct 
essentialia, which will distinguish the relationship as that of bank and customer. 
Certain terms of a contract are implied, which means that they are not expressly or 
tacitly included. These terms, known as naturalia, may be implied by law or may be 
implied by trade usage. The issue of usage in general and trade usage in particular 
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will be discussed in greater detail in paragraph 4.2 below. At this stage it may be 
said that a term which is implied 
'is ... an unexpressed provision of the contract which the law imports therein, 
generally as a matter of course, without reference to the actual intention of the 
parties ... such implied terms may derive from the common law, trade usage or 
custom, or from statute. In a sense "implied term" is, in this context. a misnomer 
in that in contract it simply represents a legal duty (giving rise to a correlative 
right) imposed by law, unless excluded by the parties, in the case of certain 
classes of contractants. It is a naturalium [naturale] of the contract in question' 
(see Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration (1974 
(3) SA 506 (A))). 
2.3 The bank-customer relationship under South African law 
The relationship between the bank and its customer is essentially founded on 
contract (Willis op cit at 24; A B Fourie The Banker and the Law (1993) at 1 ). A 
feature of the relationship is that it is usually governed by a general unwritten and 
undefined contract (see Paget's Law of Banking 10 ed (1989) by Mark Hapgood et al 
at 159). Banking law is one of the areas of law where reliance is almost exclusively 
placed on terms that are implied (Willis op cit at 25) (see also J Milnes Holden The 
Law and Practice of Banking Vol. 1: Banker and Customer 5 ed (1991) at 50; Gabriel 
Moens 'Can you Bank on a Bank? An examination of the Customer-Bank relationship 
in light of the Cheques and Payment Order Act 1986 (Cth)' (1988/89) 15 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 183 at 185-186). 
However, although it may be true that the basic relationship is not governed by a 
written contract, there may be any number of further and specific contracts that a 
customer may conclude with his bank in the event of him requiring further or 
specialised services. The terms and conditions of these contracts are invariably 
reduced to writing and include agreements to loan or borrow money, applications to 
open letters of credit etc (see William Blair QC 'England' in: R Cranston (ed) 
European Banking Law: The Banker-customer relationship 2 ed (1999) at 12; Megrah 
op cit at 70) 
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An application by a customer to, for example, make use of the Internet banking 
facilities offered by his bank is usually preceded by the customer agreeing to certain 
terms and conditions governing the use of the facility and setting out specifically the 
duties and rights of the customer and the bank, respectively. 
Notwithstanding the absence of a formal agreement regulating the traditional bank-
customer relationship, the relationship is nevertheless a fairly complex one with a 
number of terms being implied by law. These will now be discussed. 
3. The duties of the parties arising from the traditional bank-customer relationship 
3.1 Introduction 
The leading case dealing with the relationship between bank and customer is 
undoubtedly the Joachimson case (as discussed in Smart op cit at 3). The court in 
its judgment expressed the view that 
'there is only one contract made between the bank and its customers. The 
terms of that contract involve obligations on both sides and require careful 
statement.' (Smart op cit at 3). 
The content and scope of these obligations will be discussed in greater detail below. 
The court further held that 
'[h]aving regard to the peculiarity of that relation there must be, I consider, 
quite a number of implied superadded obligations beyond the one specifically 
mentioned in Foley v Hill and Pott v Clegg.' (see also Coaker op cit at 730). 
The terms which deal with the duties of the bank and which are generally implied in 
the bank-customer relationship and which will be discussed in this paper are: 
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The bank's duty to repay money received from its customer and act according to 
its customers mandate; 
The bank's duty of confidentiality; and 
The customers duty of care. 
3.2 The duties of the bank 
3.2.1 The bank's duty to repay money received from its customer and act according 
to its customer's mandate 
Mandate 
The contract of mandate may be described as a contract in terms of which the 
mandatory undertakes as against the mandator to do something (De Wet op cit at 
346). According to De Wet the mandators performance can take any form including 
an undertaking to perform services (see the discussion under paragraph 2.1.1 above) 
As far as a banks duty to repay money received from its customer is concerned the 
contract may be regarded as one of mandate with the bank being the mandator and 
the customer the mandatory. This is evidenced in the many instances where a bank 
performs or undertakes to perform duties and services on behalf of the customer. 
In the Joachimson case (supra), for example, the court said that 
'[t]he bank undertakes to receive money and to collect bills for its customer's 
account. The proceeds so received are not to be held in trust for the 
customer, but the bank borrows the proceeds and undertakes to repay them. 
The promise to repay is to repay at the branch of the bank where the account 
is kept, and during banking hours. It includes a promise to repay any part of 
the amount due against the written order of the customer, addressed to the 
bank at the branch ... ' (Smart op cit at 3). 
The customer's mandate to his bank may take on various forms. The mandate by 
the customer to the bank, which is contained in a cheque, is the most common form 
of mandate encountered in the context of the bank-customer relationship. Other 
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forms of mandate include debit-order instructions and instructions to remit money to 
third parties by way of telegraphic transfers etc. Also, a bank would be acting in 
terms of its customer's mandate where the customer gives his bank an electronic 
instruction via an ATM or the Internet to pay a third party. 
The role of the signature: General 
A signature is in many cases required to validate a particular legal act. In terms of 
section 2(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 one of the formalities required for the execution 
of a will is that the will be signed by the testator or some other person in his presence 
and by his direction. (It should be pointed out that section 2(3) of the Wills Act does 
provide for an exception as regards compliance with the requirement of signature in 
certain circumstances.) Likewise, a signature is a requirement for the validity of a 
bill in terms of section 2(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act. 
The Bills of Exchange Act does not define the concept 'signature'. As far as the Wills 
Act is concerned signature is defined in such a way as to include a mark. 
In Dempers v The Master (1977 (4) SA 44 (SWA)), the court, in deciding whether an 
initial could be regarded as a signature turned to the dictionary definition of signature 
to determine the issue. According to Sykes (J B Sykes (ed) The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary 6 ed (1976)) a signature is a '[p]erson's name or initials or mark used in 
signing'. Malan states that a signature is really nothing more than a 'mark placed on 
the instrument with the intention of identifying the person signing' (see F R Malan 
'Legal Implications of Electronic Storage' (1990) 2 Stellenbosch LR 153 at 165). It is 
submitted that, to the extent that a person may sign his name in a particular way a 
signature may be regarded as unique (see The e-commerce Debate ('The e-
commerce Debate'), published by the Department of Communications in July 1999; 
Bertus Pretorius 'Information technology security' in: Buys op cit at 132; W Long 
'European Initiatives for On-line Financial Services: Part 3 - Financial Services and 
the Electronic Signatures Directive' ( 1999) 14 Journal of International Banking Law 
471 at 474). 
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A signature serves a number of purposes, which can be summarised as follows: 
to identify the document to the signatory; 
to confirm the information contained in the document; 
to evidence acceptance of liability. 
In addition and as already stated, a signature also serves to identify the person 
signing the document (see Malan op cit at 165; Long op cit at 474). 
The role of the signature in giving the mandate 
In acting on a customer's mandate the signature of a customer serves to identify the 
customer as being the person authorized to perform transactions on the particular 
account. The Appellate Division has held that whilst money which a customer 
deposits into his bank account becomes the bank's money, the bank remains obliged 
to honour cheques which have been validly drawn by the customer (see S v Kearney 
supra; Willis op cit at 32; Fourie op cit at 1 ). (As far as the position in English law is 
concerned, see Holden op cit at 55 et seq). 
In considering the role that a signature plays in providing a bank with the necessary 
mandate to debit its customers account it is useful to consider the requirements of 
the Bills of Exchange Act vis-a-vis the validity of a cheque. 
In terms of the Act a cheque is valid if it complies with the definition of a bill of 
exchange. Section 2( 1) of the Act defines a bill of exchange as an 'unconditional 
order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it 
(my emphasis), requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand, or at 
a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to a specified person or 
his order, or to bearer.' It is clear that a signature is a requirement for the validity of a 
cheque. 
The Act goes further and in section 21 the Act provides that '[n]o person is liable as 
drawer, acceptor or indorser of a bill if he has not signed it as such'. 
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Therefore unless a customer has signed a cheque or other document constituting a 
mandate, the bank has no mandate to debit its customers account. 
The effect of a forged signature 
According to Willis (op cit at 35) '[i]f a bank pays a cheque to which the customer's 
signature as drawer has been forged or where the amount has been fraudulently 
raised, it can not debit the customers account with the amount so paid'. 
Section 22 of the Bills of Exchange Act deals with forged signatures and 1n this 
regard provides that 
'if a signature on a bill is forged or placed thereon without the authority of the 
person whose signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized signature 
is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the bill or to give discharge therefor 
or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired 
through or under that signature.' 
In Big Dutchman (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd (1973 (3) SA 267(W)) it 
was held that it was a fundamental principle that a bank may not debit its customer's 
account without proper authority. It can be accepted that a forged signature cannot 
constitute a mandate or order by a customer to pay (see Ina Meiring 'ATM's and 
EFTPOS: Some legal considerations' (1987) 9 Modem Business Law 115 at 116 
(Meiring ATM's); Julianna J Zekan 'Comparative Negligence Under the Code: 
Protecting Negligent Banks against Negligent Customers' (1992) 26 University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 125 at 149). 
3.2.2 The bank's duty of confidentiality 
The content of the duty 
It is an accepted principle in our law of banking today that a bank is expected to treat, 
in confidence, the affairs of its customer. 
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The extent of the bank's duty of confidentiality was explained in Toumier v National 
Provincial and Union Bank of England ([1924] 1 KB 461 ). According to the court the 
duty extends to all transactions which go through a customer's account as well as to 
securities. It was said that the duty did not end when an account was closed or when 
an account ceased to be active. Furthermore, the information which is subject to the 
duty is not limited to account information only, but to information obtained from other 
sources as well. The only instance where, according to the court, the duty no longer 
applied was where information was obtained by the bank after the customer had 
ceased to be a customer of that particular bank. 
The origin of the duty 
Common law 
In South Africa the bank's duty of confidentiality was recognised as early as 1914. In 
Abrahams v Bums (1914 CPD 452) as discussed in Fourie op cit at 51 the court held 
that 
'[t]he ... rule is that a banker will be liable for any actual damage sustained by his 
customer in consequence of an unreasonable disclosure to a third party of the 
state of his account . . . I incline to the view that the rule which would now be 
adopted according to the authorities in the English courts, is that a banker would 
be held liable if he, without sufficient reason, disclosed the state of a customer's 
account to a third party and damage resulted.' 
Case law 
Over the years the bank's duty of confidentiality has been approved in a number of 
decisions (Cambanis Buildings case (supra); G S George Consultants and 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and others v Datasys (Pty) Ltd (1988 (3) SA 726 (W). In 
Oensam (Pty) Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty) Ltd (1991 (1) SA 100 (A) the Appellate Division 
finally approved the bank's duty of confidentiality. 
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In the G S George Consultants case the court held that the tacit or implied duty of 
secrecy between a bank and its customer was so personal in nature that an element 
of delectus personae was present. This precluded a bank from ceding its claim 
against its customer as it would mean revealing information about its customer to a 
third party. 
In the Densam case the Appellate Division rejected the decision in the G S George 
case holding that where a bank ceded the claim against its customer it did so to 
further its own interest in collecting an overdraft. Where a bank therefore acted in 
furthering its own interest it was able to ceded its claim and reveal information about 
its customer to a third party. 
Banking code 
The Banking Council of South Africa published The Code of Banking Practice on 3 
April 2000 ('the Banking Code'). The Banking Code was extensively advertised in 
the press for some time before the date on which it became effective. Member banks 
are also required to make available to their customers copies of the Banking Code. 
The Banking Code has enforced the position at common law, which requires a bank 
to keep its customer's personal account information confidential. In this regard 
clause 4.1.1 of the Banking Code provides that 
'[w]e will treat all your personal information as private and confidential (even 
when you are no longer a customer).' 
Member banks have accepted the jurisdiction of the Banking Adjudicator to, where 
appropriate, make binding rulings which are based on law and to make 
recommendations based on the Banking Code. 
Exceptions to the general rule 
The duty of confidentiality is an implied term of the bank-customer relationship and, 
save for four exceptions, a bank is always obliged to keep its customer's personal 
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account information confidential. The four exceptions to a bank's duty of 
confidentiality, first raised in the Tournier case (supra), are: 
where disclosure is under compulsion by law; 
where there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
where the interests of the bank require disclosure; or 
where the disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer. 
3.3 The customer's duty to exercise reasonable care 
The court, in the Joachimson case (supra) (as discussed in Smart op cit at 3), said 
that 
'[t]he customer on his part undertakes to exercise reasonable care in 
executing his written orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate 
forgery.' 
We have seen that a bank is precluded from debiting its customer's account if the 
customer's signature is forged or if the instruction to the bank was not authorized 
(see paragraph 3.2.1 ). However, should the customer know of the forgery or know of 
the lack of authority and he fails, nevertheless, to inform his bank in time, the bank 
may be allowed to debit its customers account notwithstanding the fraudulent 
signature or lack of authority (see Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and 
Promissory Notes 3ed (1997) by F R Malan & J T Pretorius ('Malan on Bills of 
Exchange') 350). 
On the basis of the aforegoing it has been held that a customer owes his bank a duty 
to draw his cheques in such a way as to prevent forgery or alteration. Therefore 
where a customer, in drawing a cheque, leaves blank spaces or in some other 
fashion makes it easier to perpetrate a fraud using his cheque, the customer would 
bear the loss (see Willis op cit at 35). 
In Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd (1984 1 Lloyd's Rep 555) the 
Privy Council held that, unless there was an express agreement between a bank and 
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its customer, the customer's duty of care would be limited only to a duty not to draw a 
cheque so as to facilitate fraud or forgery and to inform the bank as soon as he 
became aware of any forged or unauthorized cheques (see also Moens op cit at 186-
189). The customer's duty did not, according to the Privy Council. extend to taking 
reasonable precautions to prevent forged cheques from being presented for 
payment. According to Malan (op cit at 354), the position in South Africa would 
probably be the same. 
3.4 The concept of 'customer' in banking law 
A further issue, which merits a brief discussion under this paragraph, is the one of 
when and how a person becomes a customer of a bank. Put differently, at what point 
in time can one say that the implied terms of the bank-customer relationship apply to 
the relationship between the bank and its customer actually be implied? One reason 
why it is necessary to establish whether a customer is indeed a customer of a bank is 
that the various terms which are implied by law in the bank-customer relationship 
exist only if there is in fact a bank-customer relationship (see Anon 'Implied terms in 
the banker and customer relationship (The Maira (No.3))' (1989) 1 Lloyds Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 40 at 41 ). 
Only if there is in fact a bank-customer relationship does the bank's duty of 
confidentiality and duty to pay strictly in terms of the customer's mandate arise. 
Likewise, in the absence of the bank-customer relationship there is no duty on the 
customer to take reasonable precautions to prevent forgery. In Internet banking it is 
possible that one may encounter a new type of banking customer who does not fit 
the traditional mould of a customer as contemplated in the bank-customer 
relationship (see paragraph 3.2). 
As a recent newspaper article puts it '[i]nternet banking may increase convenience, 
but it also has the potential to reduce loyalty,' (see Ryan op cit at 6). It is submitted 
that with the advent of Internet banking, customers may be inclined to move more 
regularly between banks hence the need to understand when a customer may be 
regarded as a customer. 
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According to Willis (op cit at 24) the court in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of 
Bantu Education 1966 ( 1) SA 229 (N) referred with approval to a statement made by 
Lord Davey in The Great Western Railway Co v London and County Banking Co Ltd 
([1901] AC 414 at 420) to the effect that 
'[i] think that there must be some sort of account, either a deposit or a current 
account or some similar relation, to make a man a customer of a banker.' 
The starting point in determining whether someone is a customer of a bank or not is 
to determine whether he maintains a bank account with a banking institution. 
However, this need not always be the case as the court in Importers Company v 
Westminster Bank Ltd ([1927] 2 KB 297 at 305) alluded to the possibility that persons 
doing other types of business with a bank could also be regarded as customers. 
It would seem that the possibility of persons switching their accounts on a regular 
basis would not preclude them from being regarded as customers of a particular 
bank. According to the court in Commissioners of Taxation v English, Scottish and 
Australian Bank ([1920] AC 683) the duration of the relationship is not of the essence 
in the bank-customer relationship (Willis op cit at 27, I F G Baxter The Law of 
Banking 3 ed (1981) at 13 and Hapgood op cit at 160-161). In National Bank of 
Greece SA v Pinos Shipping Co. No. 1 (The Maira) (No. 3) ([1988] Lloyds Rep. 126) a 
bank-customer relationship was assumed to exist despite there having been only 
three transactions on the account in a period of eight years (see (The Maira)(No.3) 
op cit at 41 ). Provided that a person has an account with a bank or some other 
relationship, such a person will be regarded as a customer of the bank regardless of 
how long he maintains the account. 
4 Custom in banking law 
4.1 Introduction 
The terms and conditions normally associated with the traditional bank-customer 
relationship may be amended by agreement between the parties. In the field of 
banking law a number of specific contracts may contain certain terms and conditions 
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which may be regarded as standard terms and conditions applying to all Internet 
banking agreements. These terms and conditions may, over time, acquire the status 
of a trade usage in the particular field of business. However before a rule can be 
regarded as a trade usage a number of requirements have to be satisfied. 
Before proceeding with a discussion of custom in banking law it is necessary to 
determine what is meant by the term custom. 
English law draws a distinction between custom and usage. The term custom in 
English law refers to a particular rule, which has existed from time immemorial and 
has obtained the force of law in a particular locality. The rule of law need not be 
consistent with general common law to subsist. Hugo summarises the concept of 
custom as a rule which is 'immemorial, reasonable and certain' (Chari Hugo 'The 
Legal Nature of the Uniform Customs and practice for Documentary Credits: Lex 
Mercatoria, Custom or Contracts?' 6 (1994) SA Mere LJ 145 at 156). 
Usage, in English law is regarded as a rule which is notorious, certain, reasonable 
and does not offend against the intention of any legislative enactment (Hugo op cit at 
157). 
Where a rule in English law may not qualify as a custom it may nevertheless be 
treated as a usage. A usage acquires the nature of a trade usage if it acquires such 
notoriety in a particular trade that any person who enters into a contract of a nature 
affected by a trade usage must have done so with the intention of being so bound by 
the usage (Hugo op cit at 158). 
For purposes of this paper the term custom is used to refer to a particular type of 
trade usage. It is submitted that as we are dealing with a particular trade or 
business, namely banking and more particularly with a specific branch of that trade 
such as Internet banking that any rules which emanate therefrom may be capable of 
being regarded as a trade usage. According to Sharrock a trade usage is a rule of 
law which 'is read into contracts made within the trade concerned even if one or both 
of the parties concerned are unaware of it' (R Sharrock Business Transaction Law 4 
ed (1996)). 
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4.2 Requirements for the recognition of a trade usage under South African law 
Unlike English law no distinction is drawn in South African law between a custom and 
a trade usage (see Tropic Plastic and Packaging Industry v Standard Bank of SA_Ltd 
(1969 (4) SA 108 (D) at 119); for a discussion of the distinctions which do exist 
between South African law and English law, see Hugo op cit at 162-165; AN Oelofse 
The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective ( 1997) at 17 -
18). 
In paragraph 2.2 it was pointed out that the naturalia of a contract may be implied by, 
amongst others a trade usage. In Crook v Petersen Ltd (1927 WLD 62 at 71) and 
Golden Cape Fruits (Pty) Ltd v Fotoplate (Pty) Ltd (1973 (2) SA 642 (C) at 645G) the 
requirements for a trade usage to be implied as a term of a contract were set out as 
follows: 
be universally and uniformly observed within the particular trade concerned; 
be long established 
notorious; 
be reasonable and certain; and 
not conflict with positive law or the provisions of the law of contract (see A J Kerr 
The Principles of the Law of Contract 5 ed (1998) at 354, see also W G Schulze 
'The South African Banking Adjudicator - A Brief Overview' (2000) 12 SA Mere LJ 
38 at 50). 
It is not certain whether a trade usage is required to be long established in order to 
qualify as a trade usage. Christie queries this requirement, as does Kerr (R H 
Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) at 183, Kerr op cit at 355). 
According to Christie 'if a trade usage in a new trade, or an old trade or an old trade 
experiencing new circumstances, fulfills all the other requirements, it would seem 
wrong not to imply it in a contract simply on account of its recent origin, but of course 
recent origin may have an important bearing on whether the usage is notorious.' 
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According to Kerr the requirement of notoriety is met and the other party is bound 
even if that party had no knowledge of the usage. A particular usage will acquire 
notoriety within a branch of trade when any person in that branch entering into a 
contract affected by the usage does so with the intention that the usage forms part of 
the contract (see also Coutts v Jacobs (1927 EDL 120)). 
As far as Roman Dutch law is concerned the court in Catering Equipment v Friesland 
Hotel (1967 (4) SA 336 (0) at 399) came to the conclusion that there is no authority 
supporting a distinction between trade usage and custom such as which exists in 
English law. 
In two recent cases ABSA Bank Bpk v Saunders (1997 (2) SA 192 (NC); ABSA Bank 
h/a Volkskas Bank v Retief (1999 (2) SA 322 (NC) the requirements for the 
recognition of trade usages in banking law were discussed. In the Saunders case 
the court, in accepting that there is a long-standing usage among commercial banks 
to charge interest rates on overdrawn facilities, accepted without question the 
requirements for the recognition of a trade usage as laid down in the Golden Cape 
Fruits case. However in the Retief case the court came to a different conclusion 
holding that before a bank could rely on a trade usage it would have to prove such 
usage. 
It is submitted that, in South African law at least, there should be no requirement that 
a custom had to have existed since time immemorial to find application (see Kerr op 
cit at 355; Schulze op cit at 51-52). As far as banking law is concerned Schulze is of 
the opinion that banking practice qualifies as a type of trade usage, as it is one 
prevalent in the banking sphere (Schulze op cit at 53). 
If a trade usage is not required to be a long standing usage in order for it to be 
recognised as such, then it is conceivable that in the fast moving world of banking 
certain practices may become accepted as trade usages fairly quickly. According to 
Schulze (op cit at 53), in the field of banking law the fast pace of development has 
resulted in the law lagging behind. In relation to banking it is necessary for the law to 
be more flexible in order that it can adapt to changing and new circumstances (see in 
this regard Standard Bank of SA Limited v Oneanate supra at 530G - 531 B). 
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5 The effects of Internet banking on the bank-customer relationship 
5.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that 'the flexibility offered by Internet banking particularly the 
ability to conduct banking business at any time and through any Internet connection, 
coupled with relatively low transaction costs' outweigh the risks involved in 
transacting banking business online' (see Swart 'Online banking law and payment 
systems' in: Buys op cit at 294). 
However, it is precisely the risk involved in transacting banking business via the 
Internet that raises questions regarding the obligations of the bank and its customer 
in the bank-customer relationship. Other issues which may also be raised in 
connection with Internet banking include, the time and place of payment and the time 
and place of the formation of contract to name but a few. These issues will, however, 
not be addressed in this paper. 
Internet banking holds a number of consequences for the traditional bank-customer 
relationship. For purposes of this paper attention will be given to: 
The obligation of the bank to act according to its customers mandate when 
honouring a payment instruction (including the need for the bank to identify it's 
customer); 
The bank's duty of confidentiality which requires of a bank to keep its customer's 
personal information confidential; and 
The duty of care imposed on a customer that requires that the customer does not 
allow an opportunity for his account to be used fraudulently. 
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5.2 The bank's duty to act in terms of its customer's mandate 
5.2.1 Introduction 
We have indicated under paragraph 3.1.1 above that a ba~ has a duty to pay on 
demand and in accordance with its customer's instructions. provided that there are 
no legal reasons preventing the bank from paying. Therefore, where a signature is 
forged the customer's authority to his bank is lacking. 
Any mark, which identifies an act with a certain party, may be regarded as a 
signature. Over and above identifying a person, a signature may also indicate a 
willingness to be bound to a particular contract and acknowledgement that the 
contents of a particular agreement at the time of signing are correct (see Gezina 
Aletta Meiring 'Regsaspekte van die Rekenarisering van die Betalingstelsel (((1998) 
LLD thesis, University of South Africa) at 199) (Mering Regsaspekte); Tana Pistorius 
'Formation of Internet contracts: An analysis of the contractual and security issues' 
(1999) 11 SA Mere LJ 282 at 295; paragraph 3.2.1 above). 
An area of concern in Internet banking is the inability of the bank to identify its 
customer. The validity of the customer's mandate (as evidenced by his signature) 
continues to be a requirement for debiting a customers account whether a 
transaction is paper based (such as a cheque) or electronic (such as an instruction 
given by way of the Internet). 
A perusal of the various Internet banking contracts reveals that banks generally, will 
not verify or inquire into the authority of a person initiating a transaction where such a 
person uses the correct password and personal identification number. According to 
Meiring (ATM's op cit at 116) banks are authorized to debit the accounts of their 
customer's where withdrawals (from an ATM) are effected by using the card/PIN 
even if the use of the card/PIN was unauthorized. 
Meiring (Regsaspekte op cit at 206-207) points out that as it is impossible for the 
issuer of an electronic signature to verify whether the user is indeed the authorized 
user it is usally agreed that the customer bears the risk for unauthorized access. 
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An unauthorized user may have gained access to an account using the correct 
password and/or personal identification number but in gaining access user has either 
obtained the password and/or personal identification number by fraudulent 
means; or 
accessed the account with the knowledge of the account holder but has 
performed transactions which he was not authorized to perform. 
5.2.2 The electronic signature 
Electronic signatures, like paper signatures, are intended to serve as binding 
declarations of the intent of the signer. It is submitted that both electronic signatures 
and paper signatures indicate acceptance by the signor, to be bound by the content 
of an agreement (see The e-commerce Debate op cit at 20; Long op cit at 474). 
The term electronic signature is usually used in a broader sense to describe all 
technologies (both electronic and digital signatures) which replace hand written 
signatures in an electronic environment (see B P Aalberts & S van der Hof 'Digital 
Signature Blindness Analysis of Legislative Approaches to Electronic Authentication' 
(2000) 7 The EDI Law Review 1 at 2). 
An electronic signature in the narrower sense refers to any electronic form or symbol 
used by a party to indicate his intention to be bound to a contract. These electronic 
signatures may include any unique qualities of the signor such as a fingerprint, the 
signor's voice or even a retinal impression or a PIN number. In this sense an 
electronic signature can be regarded as unique (see Malan op cit at 165; Meiring 
ATM's op cit at 117; Long op cit at 473; Aalberts op cit at 2, The e-commerce debate 
op cit at 20). For purposes of this paper the term electronic signature should be taken 
as a reference to an electronic signature in the narrower sense. It is submitted that 
the use of an electronic signature does serve as a means of identifying the person in 
the same way as paper signature would identify the signor. 
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A digital signature on the other hand refers, in simple terms, to a numerical code or 
algorithm which is affixed to a document or message with the intention of assuring 
the recipient that the document or message is authentic. In reality a digital signature 
is not a signature at all but a form of encryption (see Malan op cit at 165; Long op cit 
at 473 to 474; Pistorius op cit at 294 to 296). 
According to Meiring (Regsaspekte op cit at 207) an 'electronic signature' neither 
identifies the customer, nor serves to indicate an intention to be bound. Rather, so 
Meiring argues, an electronic signature should rather be regarded as an access key. 
It is submitted that if by electronic signature is meant the digital signature that this 
view is correct. However, if electronic signature refers to electronic signature in the 
narrow sense then this view is incorrect. An electronic signature in the narrow sense 
is clearly unique to the person whose signature it purports to be and by attaching 
such electronic signature a person can be identifies and show is indicating his 
intention to be bound. 
In United States of America the recognition of electronic signatures to identify parties 
gained added impetus. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce 
Act 2000 was signed into law in June 2000. In terms of this Act electronic signatures 
have been given the same force in law as ink on paper. The Act will allow American 
consumers to 'sign checks, complete applications for loans or services without the 
need for a paper signature' (Deborah Charles 'Clinton to e-sign digital signature law' 
http:llwww.boot.co.zalreutersljunOO/esignature30.htm consulted on 30 June 2000). 
As far as the position in South Africa is concerned the Department of 
Communications has recognised that 
'South Africa does not at this time have a legal framework in place for 
addressing ... digital signatures'. (see The e-commerce debate op cit at 20) 
It is submitted that the recognition of electronic signatures in South Africa is still some 
way from implementation. However the need for legislation catering for the 
recognition of electronic signatures as opposed to paper signatures has been 
recognised. At present references to signature are still understood in the context of 
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paper based signatures. Until such time as statutory recognition is given to 
electronic and digital signatures the question of whether an electronic signature will 
adequately serve to identify the signor and indicate acceptance will remain. 
5.2.3 Unauthorized electronic signatures - the banks dilemma 
Although it is relatively easy for a bank to identify its customer on the basis of a 
written order such as a cheque and hence to detect forgery or fraud, where Internet 
banking transactions are concerned the identification of a customer is made more 
difficult as the bank is not in a position to positively identify its customer. As far as 
the bank is concerned the person logging on to the website is either its customer or is 
someone who is authorized to transact on behalf of its customer or someone without 
authority but with the correct electronic signature (see Long op cit at 471 ). 
Whilst the use of electronic signatures may ensure the identity of the person 
accessing the account only up to a point, the problem which remains is whether the 
person accessing the account is actually the customer and if not, whether the person 
has the necessary authority to access the account. As the user remain faceless, 
there is, ultimately no way of knowing or determining whether the user is in fact the 
authorized user or not (see Meiring ATM's op cit at 116). 
Section 22 of the Bills of Exchange Act provides that a signature is wholly inoperative 
if it is forged or placed on a bill without the authority of the person whose signature it 
purports to be and that no right to give discharge for the bill or enforce payment 
thereof can be acquired trough or under that signature. If one applies section 22 to 
Internet banking then the bank would not have any authority to debit its customer's 
account if the use of a password was unauthorized (see generally C Reed 
'Consumer Electronic Banking' (1994) 11 Journal of International Banking Law 451 at 
452; G Smith 'Online Banking liability: Liability for computer errors in Online Banking 
(1996) 12 The Computer Law and Security Report 277 at 277). 
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5.2.4 Possible solutions 
Visser addresses the issue of unauthorized withdrawals from ATMs and in doing so 
asks whether the bank or the customer should bear the risk for any unauthorized 
withdrawals (see Coenraad Visser 'Banking in the Computer Age: The Allocation of 
some of the risks arising from the Introduction of Automated Teller Machines' (1985) 
102 SALJ 646 at 646). According to Visser (op cit at 654 - 656) Oelofse's concept 
of legitimation may address the issue of who bears the risk for an unauthorized ATM 
withdrawal. According to the concept of legitimation the 'combination of card and 
PIN should be construed as formal legitimation, with the result that the customer will 
bear the risk of unauthorized withdrawals.' Put differently the customer would bear 
the risk in the event that it is found that the withdrawal was unauthorized but that the 
customer's card and correct PIN number has been used. 
The concerns regarding unauthorized Internet banking transactions may, it is 
submitted, be addressed in the same way as the concerns relating to unauthorized 
ATM withdrawals have been addressed. As Smith (op cit at 278) explains in 
comparing ATMs with the Internet, the technology is in many respects similar: 
'the browser as a whole is the plastic card, the electronic signature, the 
magnetic stripe and the password or the PIN number'. 
The solutions which have been suggested for overcoming problems of identity vis-a-
vis A TM customers, may serve as a useful guide in solving the legal problems 
associated with identifying customers making use of Internet banking services. 
In the event of the unauthorized use of a password being the equivalent of a forged 
instruction then the liability would be on the bank, except in those restricted 
circumstances which would result in the bank not being liable. The Banking Code 
provides that a bank would be liable for any losses incurred: 
after the banker was informed that a password, PIN or other selected information 
was known to another; and 
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where faults have occurred in the system etc. (see clause 4.4.4 of the Banking 
Code). 
It is submitted that the duty of a bank to pay strictly in terms of its customer's 
mandate may also be specifically excluded or curtailed by contract (see Coaker op cit 
at 730-731; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd supra discussed under paragraph 3.2.3 above) 
Where the instruction is genuine (in form), but is unauthorized. such as where a 
customer has left his password lying around thereby allowing a third party to obtain 
the password, the customer would be liable for any loss suffered (see Smith op cit at 
278). 
By analogy a customer. in an Internet banking environment, would be liable for any 
unauthorized transaction relating to his account, notwithstanding the absence of the 
customer's mandate. The majority of banks place the onus on their customers to 
ensure that passwords (and PIN numbers) are kept safe and failure to keep 
passwords safe excludes liability on the part of the banks. But the question arises as 
to whether a distinction can and should be made where liability has not been 
excluded. In most cases banks will only accept liability for losses incurred after the 
customer has informed his bank of the loss or theft of a password number (see 
clause 4.4.4 the Banking Code). 
It would be difficult for a customer to discharge the burden of proof in those cases 
where the correct password was used to carry out a transaction. A distinction can 
therefore not really be made between those instances where liability is contractually 
excluded and those cases where it is not excluded. It is submitted that where the 
bank's liability is not contractually excluded a customer would still be required to 
prove that a particular transaction was carried out without his authority or that his 
password had been stolen. The computer records of the bank would show only that 
the customer's password was used to perform a transaction. 
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5.3 The bank's duty of confidentiality in Internet banking 
The Banking Code essentially enforces the common law principle (see GS George 
Consultants (supra) that recognises that personal account information will be treated 
as private and confidential and that nothing regarding a person's account, his name 
or address will be disclosed to anyone. The Banking Code further recognises that 
information will only be disclosed in the four exceptional cases set out in the Toumier 
case (supra) (see paragraph 3.2.2). 
At the time the Toumier case was decided the records a bank held on its customers 
were held in paper form and a bank would have had a measure of control regarding 
how and where such information was kept. It would have been reasonably easy to 
restrict unauthorized access to a customer's records. This is certainly no longer the 
case. Account information is now invariably stored on a bank's computer system 
making such information easily accessible to anyone who can gain access to a 
computer. 
According to the US National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers ('the US 
National Commission') there are five areas in which the development of Electronic 
Funds Transfers (EFTs) could pose a threat to individual privacy: 
EFT will create new records of transactions; 
EFT will result in an increase in the amount of information available 1n new 
records; 
Because EFTs are electronically readable they will be more easily accessible; 
More institutions might gain access to an individuals financial records; and 
The place where a person operates a terminal would be precisely located (Anu 
Arora Electronic Banking and the Law ( 1988) at 154). 
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act 15 USC § 1693 (EFTA) whilst primarily aimed at 
'regulating access, defining consumer liability for unauthorized access and protecting 
consumers' (Donald A Doheny Sr & Graydon John Forrer 'Electronic Access to 
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Account Information and Financial Privacy' (1992) 109(5) Banking Law Journal 436 
at 448) does, to a limited degree, address issues relating to privacy. 
The EFTA does not specifically deal with the five areas in which EFTs could pose a 
threat to individual privacy. Rather the EFTA provides that banks must advise their 
customers under what circumstances the bank will disclose information concerning 
the customer's account to third parties. 
Appendix A of the Code of Federal Regulations of the EFTA provides a model 
disclosure statement for use by banks. In terms of this model statement banks will 
disclose information to third parties in certain circumstances only (see Doheny op cit 
at 448). According to Doheny (op cit at 454) banks would considerably reduce their 
liability if they allowed their customer's a choice between easy access to their 
accounts or record confidentiality. In other words if customer's who were wanting to 
make use of Internet banking facilities were advised that the use of the Internet may 
impact on the confidentiality of their personal account information they may not be so 
willing to transact on the Internet. 
In South Africa the Department of Communications has expressed the view that 
'[t]he technology of the Internet has made it increasingly easy to obtain detailed, 
personal information about users, without their knowledge or consent' (see The 
e-commerce debate op cit at 16). 
The concerns raised by the US National Commission regarding the threat that EFTs 
could pose for individual privacy can just as readily be applied in the South African 
context (see page 32 above). 
According to the South African Department of Communications financial information 
is one of three categories of information which consumers regard as being 
particularly sensitive information (the other two categories being medical information 
and child-related information) (see The e-commerce Debate op cit at 16). 
33 
The risk of the unauthorized access of personal confidential information via the 
Internet should not be underestimated. As computer technology becomes more 
advanced so it becomes easier for unauthorized persons ('hackers') to gain access 
to information. Reports of hackers gaining access to and making use of personal 
information abound. One such report concerns a hacker by the name of Kevin 
Mitnick who allegedly broke into a computer network and stole thousands of credit 
card numbers (see M E Budnitz 'Privacy protection for consumer transactions in 
electronic commerce: Why self regulation is inadequate' (1998) 49 South Carolina 
Law Review at 851 ). (For an in depth discussion of the Mitnick case as well other 
incidents see W Stent Risk of fraud with specific reference to Internet Banking 
(((1997) M.Comm dissertation, RAU) at 18 et seq). 
Although the literature does not indicate what Mitnick did with the credit card 
numbers it does illustrate that the threat of a third party obtaining access to a 
customer's account is real rather than perceived. This then raises the question 
whether it can be implied that, inherent in a bank's duty of confidentiality, there is 
also an additional duty to ensure that sufficient precautions are taken to ensure the 
security of their systems against unauthorized access. 
According to Wilna Faul Grondslae van die Beskerming van die Bankgeheim (((1991) 
(LLD thesis, RAU) at 479) the position is different should a third party and not the 
bank publisize information regarding it's client. Faul (op cit at 479) cites as an 
example the unauthorized access of a bank's computer system by a person resulting 
in the customer's personal confidential information being made public. In such a 
case a bank would, according to Faul op cit at 479 have a duty to take reasonable 
precautions to ensure that its information is protected. Should a bank not take 
reasonable precautions then the bank would be acting wrongfully and would be liable 
for a breach it's duty of confidentilaity. 
It is submitted that there should be a duty on a bank to provide adequate security for 
its computer systems. In this regard one of the fundamental principles of the South 
African Banking Code provides that 
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'[w]e the members of the Banking Council undertake that we will ... have safe, 
secure and reliable banking and payment services'. 
Most banks are aware of the dangers that exist vis-a-vis their computer systems and 
take proactive measures to ensure that they comply with the duty to provide 
adequate security systems. The establishment of specific Information Technology 
departments to ensure computer security and develop new tools to counter possible 
breaches in their networks usually accomplishes this. 
5.4 The customer's duty to take reasonable care 
Implied in the bank-customer relationship is a duty on the customer to exercise 
reasonable care in executing written orders in such a way so as not to mislead the 
bank or to facilitate forgery which would result in the bank incurring losses. However 
unless expressly agreed this duty does not include a duty to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent fraud and forgery. 
In relation to Internet banking transactions it may be asked firstly, how a customer 
would facilitate forgery and secondly whether a customer could facilitate 'forgery'. It 
is submitted that the implied duty of a customer to take reasonable care could be 
extended to include a duty to take reasonable care in regard to his password. This 
reasonable care could include, for example, not giving his password to a third party 
or negligently allowing a third party to obtain his password by leaving it lying around. 
In so far as A TM transactions are concerned the Banking Code advises customers 
as follows: 
' Please ensure that you: 
• do not allow anyone else to use your card, PIN and/or password; 
• always take reasonable steps to keep their card safe and your PIN, password and 
selected personal information secret at all times; never tell anybody who offers to 
help you your PIN or password, including any bank employee; 
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• never write down or record their PIN, password or selected personal information 
without disguising it; for example, never write down or record your PIN using the 
numbers in the correct order' (see clause 4.4.2). (See also paragraph 3.2.2 
above where it is pointed out that for all intents and purposes customers should 
be aware of the Banking Code and that member banks have to provide customers 
with copies of the Banking Code). 
According to the Banking Code failure to take the recommended precautions would 
be regarded as gross negligence on the part of the customer which would result in 
the customer being liable for any losses incurred. 
In addition to these precautions customers are advised to inform their bank's as soon 
as they suspect or discover that someone else knows their PIN, password etc. 
The majority of banks require their customers to: 
Ensure the safekeeping and confidentiality of the PIN which has to be issued to 
them; and 
Notify the bank immediately should he become aware that his PIN has fallen into 
the hands of an unauthorized person. 
The contractual arrangements applying to Internet banking services generally provide 
that should customers fail to follow recommended security procedures this could inter 
alia lead to unauthorized transactions between their linked accounts. 
6 Internet banking custom 
The traditional bank-customer relationship has emerged over many years. Internet 
banking has, however, resulted in a new way of conducting personal banking 
transactions. The question that arises is whether the terms and conditions of Internet 
banking agreements can be regarded as a form of trade usage, alternatively whether 
they may be regarded as an extension of the implied duties arising out of the 
traditional bank-customer relationship (see paragraph 4.2 for a discussion on the 
requirements of a trade usage). 
36 
The possible emergence of Internet banking custom will be examined under the 
following headings: 
liability for unauthorized transactions (including the customers duty to keep his 
PIN and password safe); and 
the bank's duty to provide secure systems. 
6.1 LJability for unauthorized transactions 
One of the duties arising out of the traditional bank-customer relationship is the duty 
which rests on the bank to act in terms of the customer's mandate. This duty implies 
that where the customer's signature has been forged, the bank would be precluded 
from debiting its customer's account. Advances in banking technology will, however, 
make it increasingly difficult for customers to detect unauthorized or fraudulent 
transactions (see Zekan op cit at 129). So, for example, if an account were accessed 
without authority using the correct password the customer would be unable to assert 
that the transaction was unauthorized. Unlike a cheque which is signed and which 
can be checked, the unauthorized use of password can not be verified (see again the 
discussion under paras 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 above). 
As far as Internet banking is concerned, banks do not accept responsibility for 
unauthorized transactions (see eg clause 1 (ii) of First National Bank's FirstOnline 
Internet Service Terms and Conditions at http://firston/inelterms.asp consulted on 18 
July 2000; clause 6.1 of Nedbanks Netbank Terms and Conditions at 
http://www.nedbank.co.za/1.onlinelonline terms.html consulted on 4 July 2000; 
Terms and Conditions for Standard Bank Internet Banking at 
http:llwww.standardbank.eo.za/bankinglibterms.htm consulted on 24 July 2000). In 
terms of these agreements customers are informed that passwords (and PIN 
numbers) are to be safeguarded and that their bank's should be notified in the event 
that their passwords and PIN numbers fall into the wrong hands. Failure by a 
customer to notify his bank would entitle the bank to debit its customer's account 
notwithstanding the possibility that it may be acting without the customer's mandate. 
Even if a PIN number were stolen and used by a thief it is submitted that a bank 
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would be entitled to debit a customer's account until such time that the customer 
notified the bank of the theft of the PIN number. 
These contractual arrangements regulating the Internet banking are clearly a 
departure from the terms usually implied by law in the traditional bank-customer 
relationship. If this is the case then could it perhaps be argued that the practices of 
banks in relation to Internet banking transactions have resulted in the establishment 
of a trade usage which may be implied in all Internet banking transactions? 
The phenomenon of the ATM in the late 1970's and early 1980's raised issues similar 
to those being raised now in respect of Internet banking. Questions were asked 
regarding the authority of banks to debit their customer's account where cards and 
PIN numbers fell into the wrong hands. Today it is generally accepted that, where a 
customer fails to report the loss of his ATM card and PIN number to his bank, he 
bears the loss for any unauthorized withdrawals prior to reporting the loss. In the 
United States the EFT A limits a customers liability to $50 or the amount of the 
unauthorized transfer, whichever is the lesser, before notice has been given to the 
bank (see in this regard Meiring ATM's op cit at 119; Reed op cit at 455). Where a 
customer fails to notify his bank of the unauthorized use within two days of the loss of 
his means of access his liability my be up to $500. Where a customer fails to advise 
his bank at all of the loss of his password he would bear any losses resulting from 
unauthorized transactions. 
It is submitted that rather than regarding these contractual arrangements as a 
departure from the bank's traditional duty of acting in accordance with its customers 
mandate, that the contractual arrangements should be seen as an extension of the 
customers implied duty which requires that he draws cheques in such a way so as 
not to facilitate fraud or forgery (see Nick Locket 'How to secure electronic 
transactions' (1999) 8(3) International Financial Law Review 9 at 11 ). 
Since the electronic signature serves to authenticate a customer's Internet banking 
transaction in much the same way as a signature serves to authenticate a paper 
based transaction (see Malan op cit 164-165), a customer should ensure that he 
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does not negligently leave his password lying around or divulge the password to a 
third party. 
Whilst the Banking Code cannot be regarded as legally binding on banks (see the 
preamble of the Banking Code) it is submitted that it may nevertheless be regarded 
as a reflection of current practice among banks. 
Although the Banking Code states that the provisions of the Banking Code will not 
give rise to a trade custom it is submitted that the Banking Code nevertheless does 
leave one with the impression that the provisions are regarded as trade customs. 
This is reflected in the fact the trade usages and practices, which have been 
incorporated in the Banking Code, have existed in their own right prior to their 
incorporation in the Banking Code. The Banking Code may therefore be regarded as 
a reflection of current bank practice. 
Even though only a small fraction of bank customers make use of the Internet to 
perform their banking transactions, it is possible for a trade usage to develop within a 
closed or small group of users (see B Kozolchyk 'The Paperless Letter of Credit and 
Related Documents of Title' (1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 92 at 95). 
The limited number of users of Internet banking services should therefore not be 
regarded as an impediment to the recognition of a trade usage within the field of 
Internet banking. 
The extension of the customer's duty to include an obligation on the customer to 
protect his passwords is certainly a characteristic of most Internet banking contracts. 
As Swart (op cit at 294) points out 'the flexibility offered by Internet banking, 
particularly the ability to conduct banking business at any time and through any 
Internet connection, coupled with relatively low transaction costs, probably outweighs 
the risks involved.' It is submitted that users of Internet banking services are 
generally aware of the dangers posed by the Internet and therefore understand the 
need to secure their PIN numbers and passwords. 
In conclusion. As far as the customer's liability for Internet banking transaction is 
concerned it is submitted that the extension of the customer's traditional duty may, in 
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relation to users of Internet banking services, be regarded as a form of trade usage 
vis-a-vis Internet banking. 
6.2 The duty to provide secure systems 
The failure of bank to provide secure systems may result in the bank being liable for 
a breach of its duty of confidentiality (see Arora op cit at 155, Swart op cit at 287). 
A perusal of various Internet banking contracts reveals that the contracts themselves 
do not provide much comfort for a customer as far as the security of systems is 
concerned. Security issues are generally dealt with in a section called 'frequently 
asked questions' and do not purport to bind the bank in any way. The security 
measures adopted by banks vary, but generally the following measures are taken: 
128 bit encryption technology to scramble transaction details so that data 
intercepted on the Internet cannot be used; 
login codes and passwords; 
time out, where the link between the customers computer and the banks 
mainframe is terminated after a number of minutes have elapsed; and 
limitations on the amount of a transaction (see R Buys 'Internet Banking: The 
Risks and Benefits' (June 2000) 389 De Rebus 30 at 30). 
One of the requirements for the recognition of a trade usage is that it should be 
universally and uniformly observed. Recognition has, in principle, been given to the 
need for secure systems (see The e-commerce Debate op cit at 16 et seq). 
Likewise the Banking Code provides that banks will provide safe, secure and reliable 
banking services. It may be argued that the need for secure systems are not detailed 
enough to be regarded as a trade usage. It is submitted that, on the basis of the fact 
that anyone making use of Internet banking services expects that reasonable security 
systems will be provided, that the requirement for a trade usage in this particular 
sphere of banking is met (see par 4.2 especially Kerr's requirement of notoriety). 
It may be argued that, as the Banking Code reflects current banking practice that all 
banks, which subscribe to the Banking Code, should provide adequate Internet 
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security measures. What is adequate depends very much on what security 
measures are currently available. Smith, for example, suggests that banks should, at 
the very least 'keep up to date with the strongest readily available encryption, at least 
to the extent practicable' (see Smith op cit at 279; Meiring ATMs op cit at 117). The 
fact that security measures are subject to constant change should not affect the 
recognition of the need for security measures as a trade usage (see par 4.2 where it 
is pointed out that in the fast moving world of banking certain practices have become 
accepted as trade usages relatively quickly). 
It is submitted that the failure by banks to provide adequate security measures which 
result in a third party obtaining access to a customer's private account information 
would be regarded as a breach of a bank's duty of confidentiality. A strong argument 
exists for the recognition of a trade usage requiring banks to provide adequate 
security systems. 
7 Conclusion 
Most of the terms implied in the traditional bank-customer relationship were 
developed at a time when most customers maintained only one account with their 
banks and gave their payment instructions in writing, for example by way of a 
cheque. 
As ATMs revolutionised the way in which customers did business with their banks, so 
to is the Internet changing the way in which customers bank. Ultimately this will 
require the adaptation of the existing legal framework to provide for a new form of 
transactability. If the law does not change then the legislature will have to step in to 
protect the consumer and set new rules for conducting business (see The e-
commerce Debate op cit at 17). 
Most of the Internet banking terms and conditions which were studied for purposes of 
this paper impose on the customer a duty to protect his password and to notify his 
bank should it fall into the wrong hands or is lost. Banks can and do legitimately 
exclude liability where the account has been legitimately accessed by using a 
password. 
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Internet banking has resulted in banks expressly providing that when a customer 
makes use of Internet banking services the bank is not liable for unauthorized 
transactions. This is clearly a departure from the traditional duties implied in the 
bank-customer relationship. As most banks exclude liability and as the Banking 
Code also alludes to this exclusion of liability it is submitted that in as far as Internet 
Banking is concerned, that the practice has acquired the status of a trade usage. 
Computer security and the confidentiality of personal account information remains 
one of the biggest concerns for customers wanting to make use of Internet banking 
facilities. Although breaches in computer security are not restricted to the banking 
industry it is submitted that given the sensitivity of information held by banks that 
there is an added duty on banks to take adequate precautions. At present issues of 
computer security and confidentiality are mainly left to self-regulation. This, it is 
submitted, is not sufficient and legislation is required to, at the very least, ensure a 
measure of standardisation as regards security of computer data. 
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